

Building a Personal Data Focused Incident Response Plan to Address Breach Notification

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### lam ...

- Security Advocate & Threat Researcher focused on Data Protection
- > 25+ years experience in InfoSec
- > Spent number years in corporate IR team positions

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## Handling Personal Data Focused IR

Actual Legislation

# The GDPR

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Roadmap Legislation

- > South Korea
- Japan
- > Canada





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
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# What's your Flavour of IR



Eradicate

Remediate

Recover



# Data Breach Notification to a Supervisory Authority, are you Ready?

- > 72hours to report to DPA is key requirement in data breaches
- > Becoming aware of the breach
- destruction, loss, alteration and unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data
- > UNLESS UNLIKELY TO RESULT IN A RISK TO RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF PERSON
- Includes notification of data subject

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@ MAZK ANDERSON WWW.ANDERTOONS.COM Personal Data?

"Before I write my name on the board, I'll need to know how you're planning to use that data."




### What is Personal Data?

- > The GDPR defines IT and interprets
  - Article 4(1)
  - Recitals 15,26,28,29,30,31,34,35,36,37

 Any information relating to an identified or identifiable Natural Person

Directly or Indirectly





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What is Personal Data? Performance

App Data

License Plate

Cameras

Blackbox

Credit rating
Transactions
Mortgage
Credit Card
Loans
Taxes

Smart devices CCTV
Address





Behaviour

Health

Tracking

Comms

Contacts

IMEI

Physical/Mental health

Disability

Blood type

Drug test

Genetics DNA

References

**ANPR** 

Work history

Vetting

Contacts

Salary

Education

Access log



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### The Horrendous Truth

Country Specific Non-Sensitiv	10	Country Specific Sensitive	
	, e	I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	
Identifier		Identifier	
Name		Race/Ethnicity	
Date of birth		Religion	
Gender Address		Health/Medical Terms	Generic No Country or language
Post code	Economic	Labour Union membership	
National ID	Credit card		
Passport	**************************************	Political affiliations	Identifier
Drivers License	Non-government Identification	Criminal records	Country Tags
Nationality	numbers		IPv4
Regional nationality	Cultural identifcation	Biometric data	
Telephone		Sexual orientation	IPv6
National healthcare identify	Security Clearance	Genetic data	IMEL
Bank Account IBAN	Legal status		
Bank account national		Philosophical	GPS Coordinates
biometric data	Physical Appearance	Mental health attributes	Social Networks
fingerprints	Photo/Headshot		email address
facial recognition retinal scans			
Tax numbers	physical - height		RFID tag
VAT	physical - weight		III ID tab
Company registration	physcial - eye colour		CCTV Footage
Economic	physicall - hair colour		
	physical - birth marks	PUBLIC 10	

# DE3100A16C20Data Breach 2202E6F61636865732040 01 Cyber Attack696EM BA 106564207368



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
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## Handling Data Focused IR





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
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# Data Breach Handling Procedure





### When a Breach is not a Breach?



Exfiltration

**Destruction** 

Alteration

**Unauthorised Disclosure** 


**Unauthorised Access** 







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#### U. Launching a new processing

Every day in the digital realm, numerous services are created.

Those services usually rely on the processing of personal data aiming at fulfilling the needs of organisations or their users.

The supporting assets used to store the data have different levels of vulnerabilities toward feared events such as illegitimate acess, unwanted change, or disappearance of personal data.


Those risks are likely to have significant impacts on the users' privacy.

### 3. Adressing the risks

Once the risks have been identified, it should be determined if they are acceptable given the existing and planned technical and organisational measures.

If it doesn't seem possible in regard of the foreseen measures, the data protection authority has to be consulted.

In any case, it is mandatory to implement the planned controls before carrying out the processing.



### Considering the processing

For the data processor as well as the data subjects, those risks are unwelcome.

Before carrying out a processing, it is essential to analyse it to understand its inherent risks.

Several factors affect the riskiness of a processing, as the kind of data processed.

Generally speaking, if a processing meets two of the criteria listed, then it is likely to present high risks and would require to carry out a privacy impact assessment.

### 2. Evaluating the privacy risks

The assessment first establishes the context in which the processing is carried out, including its purpose and technical features.

In addition to studying the fundamental principles, made up of the necessity and proportionality of the processing, each risk has to be analysed to evaluate its severity and likehood according to its potential impacts on the rights and freedoms of data subjects, the data processed, the risks sources and the supporting assets.

#### The Personal Data Journey

(Data Flow Mapping)

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#### Data Security

#### Technical and organisational security measures

Data-in-transit Protection Asset Protection & Resilience Separation between users Governance Operational Security Personnel Security Secure Development Supply-chain Security

Secure Consumer Management Identity & Authentication External Interface Protection Secure Administration Audit Information Secure use of Service

#### **Data Transfer**

Names of third countries or international organisations that data is transferred to

EU US



**Data Source** 

Data Subject

Personal Data

Purpose of **Processing** 



Lawful Processing



















#### Personal Data Source

Controller Joint Controller Direct Third Party Collector

#### Categories of Individuals

Successful Candidates Pension details Potential Customers

Employees Former Employees Unsuccessful Candidates **Existing Customers** Former Customers Accountant Auditors **Business Partners** Sub-Contractors Service Providers Suppliers

Public

#### Categories of Personal Data

Contact details Bank details Tax details Pay details Annual leave details Finance Sick leave details

Performance details Management Qualifications Employment history Direct Marketing

Ethnicity Disability details Purchase history Lifestyle information Picture of subject

#### Purpose of Processing

Payroll Personnel File

Personnel Management

Security Vetting Recruitment Training

System Account

Customer Management

Criminal Offence

#### Lawful Basis of Processing Consent

Contract Legal obligation Vital Interests Public Interests

Legitimate Interest

#### **Data Retention**

#### Retention schedule

1 year post-employment 3 years post-employment 6 years post employment 6 months post-campaign 1 year post campaign End of customer relationship 1 year - post contact

#### Categories of Recipients

HMRC

Referees

Processor - Marketing

Processor - SaaS

Processor – laaS

Processor - Payment Provider

Processor - Bank

Sub-Processor – Courier

Sub-Processor - Printer





# Discovery Tools





- McAfee
- Symantec
- Forcepoint
- Digital Guardian



### > Commercial Products

- McAfee
- Symantec
- Forcepoint
- Digital Guardian
- > Multiple modes




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### Discovery Methods







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Pattern

rallem

WHENEVER I LEARN A NEW SKILL I CONCOCT ELABORATE FANTASY SCENARIOS WHERE IT LETS ME SAVE THE DAY.

OH NO! THE KILLER MUST HAVE ROLLOWED HER ON VACATION!

BUT TO FIND THEM WE'D HAVE TO SEARCH THROUGH 200 MB OF EMAILS LOOKING FOR SOMETHING FORMATTED LIKE AN ADDRESS!



- IT'S HOPELESS!











RegEx

REGEX



## Finding The Data..

> Talk to the data owners

> Crawling your environment

> Build a map

-p 6996 > financialpro > Focus your detection 4096 2011-05-07 141 2013-09-18 0 2013-09-12 16

Proprietary Tools



I KNOW REGULAR



	Positions	Length	Characters	Meaning
TO SECURIOR	1–9	9	alpha+num+<	Passport number
350	10	1	numeric	Check digit over digits 1–9
	11–13	3	alpha+<	Nationality (ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 code with modification
	14–19	6	numeric	Date of birth (YYMMDD)
~	20	1	num	Check digit over digits 14–19
	21	1	alpha+<	Sex (M, F or < for male, female or unspecified)
				indian data of consent (AAA HADD)

UK Passport ^[0-9]{10}GBR[0-9]{7}[U,M,F]{1}[0-9]{9}\$ piration date of passport (YYMMDD) eck digit over digits 22-27

29–42	14	alpha+num+<	Personal number (may be used by the issuing country	
43	1	numeric+<	Check digit over digits 29-42 (may be < if all character	
44	1	numeric	Check digit over digits 1-10, 14-20, and 22-43	

UK NI (National Insurance)  $[A-CEGHJ-PR-TW-Z]{1}[A-CEGHJ-NPR-TW-Z]{1}\040?[0-9]{2}$ 

0?[0-9]{2}\040?[a|A-z|Z]{1}

EVERYBODY STAND BACK.

UK VAT ([GB])?(([1-9]{8})|([1-9]{11}))\$

UK Bank Account ^(\d){8}\$

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passports of the European Union

https://www.gov.uk/quidance/vat-eu-country-codes-vat-nu mbers-and-vat-in-other-languages

https://github.com/tvfischer/gdpr-data-patterns-detection





# **ACTIVE**

- Endpoint
- Network

# **PASSIVE**

- Discovery Data
- •SOC/SIEM



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
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
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### **Tools and Alerts**



Building a Data Focused Detection






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### How? Let's Talk Tools





# Augment your Existing Log/SIEM

- > Feed your SIEM
- Capture File Events
  - Don't forget Not just copying
- CSV Lookups or External Lookups





# Categories and approximate number of individuals concerned



Categories and approximate number of personal data records concerned



The name and contact details of the data protection officer



A description of the likely consequences of the personal data breach



Mitigation or remediation efforts



# Personal Data Breach Notification

- > Data Processing Context
- > Ease of Identification
- > Circumstances of Breach


ENISA Personal Data Breach Severity Assessment Methodology

Severity of a data breach				
SE < 2	Low	Individuals either will not be affected or may encounter a few inconveniences, which they will overcome without any problem (time spent re-entering information, annoyances, irritation s, etc.).		
2 ≤ SE < 3	Medium	Individuals may encounter significant inconveniences, which they will be able to overcome despite a few difficulties (extra costs, denial of access to business services, fear, lack of understanding, stress, minor physical ailments, etc.).		
3 ≤ SE< 4	High	Individuals may encounter significant consequences, which they should be able to overcome albeit with serious difficulties (misappropriation of funds, blacklisting by banks, property damage, loss of employment, subpoena, worsening of health, etc.).		
4 ≤ SE	Very High	Individuals may encounter significant, or even irreversible, consequences, which they may not overcome (financial distress such as substantial debt or inability to work, long-term psychological or physical ailments, death, etc.).		

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/data-protection/personal-data-breaches/personal-data-breach-notification-tool

# Let's Talk

Why, Which, When, Where, Who and How





## Why? And Which?

- Has new legislation and compliance requirements made you change your IR process?
  - If yes, What impact has regulation like GDPR had on your IR process and procedure?
  - If no, Why not?
- > Which IR model do you use? OODA, SANS, NIST, Home grown
  - Which steps have you modified to support



### When?

- > Do you currently focus your IR on personal data detection?
- How do you currently associate a security event to a data breach? And at what time?

> What about red team exercises? i.e. How do you test?



### What? & Where?

- Does the current generous definition of PII suite new regulation requirements?
- Do you know where personal data is stored and used?
  - Have you identified more sensitive area of data storage?

>



### How?

- How (or what tools) do you currently use to identify and inventory personal data?
- > How do we do detect the "non exfiltration" breaches?



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### Who?

- > Is the DPO in the team?
  - When do you bring the DPO in?
- > How does your interaction with PR/Comms work?
- > Who communicates with the DPA?
- > Which DPAs do you inform?

Data Governance/ Protection

Information Security

**IT Operations** 


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P.R.

Facilities Management

# Final Thoughts





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
# Data Breaches are Here to Stay

About 28% of organisation are not ready of the GDPR (survey)

1 in 6 Business unprepared for a Data Breach




340m individual records publicly accessible server 2 terabytes of data



Ticketmaster has admitted that it has suffered a security breach, which the BBC understands has affected up to 40,000 UK customers.

Malicious software on third-party customer support product Inbenta Technologies caused the hack, the firm said on Twitter



According to BA, the stolen data did not include travel or passport information. It does, however, appear to have included the personal and financial details of those booking travel via the BA website and mobile app during the affected period. As many as 380,000 payment cards were exposed to the intruders.



"At one point I thought changing my name might help with privacy, but that was before the Internet."

Olivia Wilde

https://github.com/tvfischer/gdpr-data-patterns-detection

... under construction still needs a lot of work

### @Fvt

- > tvfischer+sec@gmail.com tvfischer@pm.me
- > keybase.io/fvt